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COMMENT
The Oklahoma Drug Dealer Liability Act: A Civil
Remedy for a "Victimless" Crime
L Introduction
The market for illegal drugs perpetuates violence, disintegrates communities,
fosters corruption, and ruins lives. In the first half of 1997, illegal drug use was a
factor in over 269,000 emergency room visits.! The Bureau of Justice Statistics
reports that 21% of inmates convicted of property crimes were under the influence
of drugs, and 16.3% were under the influence of both drugs and alcohol.' Similarly,
13.5% of inmates convicted of violent crimes said they were using illegal drugs
when they committed their crime, and 14.3% were using both drugs and alcohol3
While criminal law has been used aggressively as a weapon in the "war on drugs,"
it has done very little for the war's victims: those injured by drugs or drug-related
crime.4 Civil law, however, has engaged the drug problem only as an instrument
of deterrence and punishment (through civil forfeiture proceedings), and not in its
traditional role of remediation.
On September 24, 1996, California Governor Pete Wilson signed into law a bill
enabling victims of drug-related injuries to sue drug dealers.s Actor Carroll
O'Connor's advocacy played an important part in this bill's passage.6 The elder
O'Connor (who played Archie Bunker on TV's All in the Family) sought compen-
sation for the suffering caused by his son's drug-related suicide, only to find that the
common law effectively barred recovery from dealers for injuries caused by illegal
drugs that had been used voluntarily.7 Ironically, O'Connor was himself prevented
1. See Semi-Annual Trends in Total Drug Episodes at thl. 6.12 (visited Oct. 11, 1998)
<http'Jlwww.samhsa.gov/oastdawnldawnrndyr/dawnl3a8.htm#E9E9>.
2. See Percent of Convicted Jail Inmates Who Committed the Current Offense While Using Drugs
or Alcohol at tbl. 6.12 (visited Aug. 10, 1998) <http:/www.albany.edulsourcebook/1995/pdf/t632.pdf>
("Alcohol or drug use at time of offense by adults on probation"). These figures reflect only the most
serious offense for which the offender is currently serving time. For example, an offender serving time
for one count of grand larceny and five counts of petty larceny would be recorded in this survey only
on the grand larceny charge.
3. See id.
4. Prevailing cynicism toward the effectiveness of United States drug policy seems to require that
the phrase "war on drugs" appear in quotation marks.
5. See California Governor Signs Drug Dealer Liability Bill, WESTs LEGAL NEws, Sept. 26, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 541308.
6. See Dennis Anderson, Actor Carroll O'Connor Supports Bill to Sue Drug Dealers, ASSOCIATED
PRESS POL. SERV., June 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5387297.
7. See id O'Connor's son, Hugh, killed himself in 1995 after a long battle with drug use. "rd sue
him up the bahzoo if the bill became law," O'Connor said of the man convicted of supplying drugs to
his son. Id.
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from suing under the new California law because of a clause barring the law's
prospective application,8 but his plight publicized a largely unrecognized trend in
legislation assigning civil liability to drug dealers.
Eleven states now impose civil liability on drug dealers,9 with Oklahoma passing
its own drug dealer liability act in 1994." All of these bills are sweeping in scope
and radical in their approach; however, they have received comparatively little
media attention to date. They have enjoyed little notoriety at the courthouse," and
public awareness of the issue is minimal.
What scant attention these laws have generated disparages the laws'
constitutionality ard deprecates their practicality. These concerns could explain their
lack of use. This Comment demonstrates that Oklahoma's Drug Dealer Liability Act
(ODDLA) can effxtively address its goals of compensating drug dealers' victims
and deterring the sale of illegal drugs. This Comment also responds to objections
raised about the Act's constitutionality and effectiveness.
II. Common Law Bar to Recovery for Victims of Narcotics-Related Injuries
Traditional legal remedies fail to provide relief to drug dealers' victims. Absent
a statute assigning liability to drug sellers, drug-related injuries must be borne by
victims. While common law remedies may enable recovery against a user of illegal
drugs who was responsible for an injury, they offer no hope for collecting against
deeper, and perhaps, guiltier pockets higher up the chain of distribution.
Attempts to recover under theories of negligence, products liability, and strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activity are frustrated by traditional common law
principles.1 Suits brought under theories of negligence are fruitless because the
consumption of drugs, rather than their sale, would be found to be the proximate
cause of any resulting injury to the user or to a third party. 3 Products liability
theory is inadequate, because it covers only items "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer."'4 Because "the
8. See CAL HEALTH & SAFErY CODE, § 11716 (West Supp. 1996). The clause prohibits suits
arising from injuries which occurred before the bill became effective.
9. See ARK. CorE ANN. § 16.124.102-112 (Michie 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY CODE, §§
11700-11730 (West Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.12 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-
46 (1997); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663 D-14 (1997); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57/1-85 (West Supp. 1998); IND.
CODE § 34-1-70-1-20 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.61-.76 (West Supp. 1999); MIcH. COMP.
LAws § 691.1601-1619 (1994); 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2-424-34 (Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs §
772.12 (Michie Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37e-1-14 (1997).
10. Interview with Rep. John Bryant, Oklahoma House of Representatives, in Oklahoma City, Okla.
(Apr. 11, 1997).
11. As of 1996, only one appellate court had reviewed a dealer liability law. See Ficano v. Clemens,
No. 95-512918 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County 1995).
12. See Michael E. Bronfin, "Gram Shop" Liabilily: Holding Drug Dealers Civilly Liable For
Injuries To Third Parties and Underage Purchasers, 1994 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 345, 346.
13. See id. at 351-52. Bronfin compares a suit by a drug user against his dealer to the traditional
doctrine of dram shop liability, where a tavern customer's consumption of alcohol is viewed as the
proximate cause of injury instead of the tavern owner's selling it.
14. RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
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ordinary adult drug consumer presumably knows the dangers posed by the use of
illegal drugs, a drug dealer would only be liable under this theory if she had sold
a drug more dangerous than normal."" Finally, strict liability for an abnormally
dangerous or "ultra-hazardous" activity is inapposite. Even if a court were to
consider the sale of illegal drugs to be an abnormally dangerous activity, this sort
of liability does not extend to victims who contribute to their own injury," as
would be the case of a drug user who voluntarily uses an illegal substance. 7
Despite these barriers, some hope may yet exist for actions brought under the
theory of ultra-hazardous activity. In 1993, a Connecticut state court ruled that a
jury would be allowed to hear such a claim against an alleged cocaine dealer. 8 In
Prete v. Laudano, the plaintiff was assaulted and injured by a man who suffered
from a "physical and psychological condition" brought about by ingesting "a large
quantity of cocaine," which he allegedly bought from the defendant. 9 Prete
claimed that cocaine is "an inherently dangerous substance, the sale of which gives
rise to a substantial likelihood of injury to others."'2 The Prete court held that
merely because Connecticut courts had not yet extended strict liability to drug
dealers, the plaintiff should not be denied her chance to prove the facts establishing
strict liability.
2
'
These three common law barriers to lawsuits against drug dealers turn on one
crucial element: once the drug user voluntarily consumes an illegal drug he becomes
the proximate cause of any resultant injury. At that point, the dealer is no longer
liable. Therefore, despite the favorable ruling in Prete, the prospects for recovery
against drug dealers under common law are severely limited.
IlL Alternatives to Drug Dealer Liability Laws
Three systems have been proposed to circumvent these common law barriers to
recovery from drug dealers. One plan calls for stiffening judicial sanctions imposed
at sentencing in a criminal drug trial.' The second solution, dubbed "gram-shop
liability," emphasizes compensation of drug dealers' victims through a more
narrowly focused and traditional application of tort law' The third system is the
sort of drug dealer liability statute adopted by California, Oklahoma, and ten other
states.' All three proposals aim to deter illegal drug trafficking as well as provide
relief for victims of injuries arising from drug use. While the first two plans lack
the sweeping character of the new dealer liability laws, they are easier to assimilate
15. Bronfin, supra note 12, at 349-50.
16. See h at 346-48.
17. See id. at 348.
18. See Prete v. Laudano, No. 337966, 1993 WL 21417 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1993).
19. Id. at *l.
20. 1d.
21. See id.
22. See Recent Legislation, Tort Law - Civil Liability for Criminal Acts - Illinois Expands Civil
Liability of Drug Traffickers, 109 HARV. L. REv. 699, 704 (1996).
23. See Bronfin, supra note 12, at 345.
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
into the existing constitutional and statutory framework. As demonstrated below,
although each alternative has its own advantages and disadvantages, neither
restitution nor grnm-shop liability would serve these common goals as well as
would drug dealer liability legislation.
A. Restitution
The first proposed plan allows carefully tailored settlements to be awarded to
victims through mandatory restitution, assigned by a judge, to be paid as part of a
criminal sentence.' Such a system would protect a defendant's rights and eliminate
the need for a civil trial.' Judicial discretion is certainly an efficient means of
recovery. Judge-crdered restitution to victims of drug-related crimes serves as an
uncomplicated anl expedient remedy, a component of punishment that prohibits
unjust enrichment, and acts as a deterrent to other would-be drug dealers.
Currently, however, judicially ordered restitution is not a widely utilized option
in drug cases, even at the federal level where courts are required to consider "the
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense" as part of the criminal
sentencing procedure Indeed, restitution was ordered in only 194 of 15,463
federal drug trafficking cases in fiscal 1994' Additionally, a recent addition" to
the federal sentencing guidelines allows a court to demand "community restitution"
should the defendant's crime cause "public harm" but has no "identifiable victim.""
This provision is intended to mandate restitution in "victimless" drug cases."'
Community restitution, however, does nothing to encourage the recognition and
relief of actual drug-related injuries.
Despite the potential benefits of community restitution, individual victims' rights
are better safeguarded through a civil suit. Civil discovery may reveal a dealer's
hidden or unknown assets that could be used to satisfy ajudgment. A civil trial also
encourages the identification of new drug-related injuries that would not ordinarily
come to light at a criminal sentencing. Not all of the consequences of a drug
transaction may have developed by the time of a criminal trial, since the effects of
illegal drugs often take time to manifest themselves. For example, marijuana smoke
contains more cacinogenic chemicals than does tobacco smoke, and a consequent
cancer might not be diagnosed until after a drug dealer was sentenced?2 Hal-
lucinogens, such -s LSD and PCP, can cause violent behavior and effects such as
25. See Recent L.gislation, supra note 22. at 704.
26. See id.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (Supp. 111996).
28. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, at thl. 5.34 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995). This figure
represents only a tiny fraction of the number of occasions when a fine was included in a sentence for
drug trafficking: 2558 of those same cases in the same time period. Id.
29. See U.S. SENrENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 324-25 (1997).
30. Id at 325 background note.
31. See id.
32. See U.S. DEP'r OF EDUCATION, WHAT WORKS: SCHOOLS WITHOUT DRUGS (1989) (reproduced
by Library of Congres;).
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flashbacks long after use has ceased.' Long-term amphetamine users may develop
paranoid psychosis.' Since the identification of drug-related injuries does not
follow the same schedule as the criminal justice system, there is no reason to allow
relief for injuries apparent only at the moment of sentencing - or even to require
a criminal conviction at all.
Furthermore, it is incongruous that the summary and potentially arbitrary
assessment of damages by a trial judge is considered superior to the careful and
exacting process of a civil trial. A civil trial allows a defendant to examine a
plaintiffs evidence, to attack the legal elements of a plaintiffs case, and to dispute
or appeal the amount of a judgment and ensure that it is commensurate with the
degree of a plaintiffs injury. Restitution also allows no apportionment of a
judgment according to the degree of a plaintiffs comparative responsibility. Even
though a convicted drug offender might be "estopped from denying his participation
in the drug market,"3 he is still entitled to more protection through a civil trial
than he would be when sentenced to mandatory restitution. Should a judge elect to
assign a payment of restitution as part of a criminal drug sentence, he has
effectively performed the function of a jury in a suit under a drug dealer liability
act. The interests of justice, and both defendants' and victims' rights, are better
served by an adversarial hearing in which a plaintiffs evidence can be put to the
test.
B. "Gram-Shop Liability"
A second proposed alternative to drug dealer liability acts involves a statutory
codification of "gram-shop liability" - an adaptation of the principles of tort law
negligence and of "dram shop liability" (tort law relating to the liability of tavern
keepers) to the illegal drug market.' This proposal would establish a much
narrower opportunity for recovery, but would have the constitutional safety of
embracing existing principles of tort law.
Under such a law, an innocent third-party victim harmed by a drug dealer's trade
could seek recovery from the dealer only "if she could prove (1) that the drug
dealer's illegal drugs were used by the party who injured her, and (2) that these
drugs contributed to the party's action that resulted in her injury."'37 The proposed
"gram-shop liability" statute further allows recovery by an underage drug user, but
not by a knowing adult who willfully used drugs.' A knowing adult has the last
clear chance to avoid the injury, by deciding not to use the illegal narcotics.39
According to this theory, bearing the cost of a self-inflicted injury should help to
33. See id.
34. See id
35. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-431(B) (West 1999).
36. See Bronfin, supra note 12, at 351-52.
37. Id at 353.
38. See id. at 357-58.
39. See id. at 359.
1999]
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deter drug use.' However, trends in national drug use suggest the deterrent effect
of current tort lawy appears insignificant.4'
While "gram-shop liability" law may be constitutionally safer than dealer liability
legislation, it mandates that a plaintiff seeking recovery prove that the drugs the
defendant sold wvere the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury! 2 This re-
quirement demonstrates admirable enterprise in defense of drug dealers' due process
rights, but unfortunately it presents a practical bar to recovery by injured plaintiffs.
Dram shop liability was a doctrine that evolved to deter the negligent dispensation
of alcoholic beverages - drugs with which science is relatively familiar. 3 A jury
can conclude with a fair amount of certainty that the four martinis an intoxicated
driver consumed an hour before a car wreck impaired his reactions and caused the
accident. It is unlikely that the glass of wine the same driver had a week ago was
affecting his mind at the time of the accident. The long-term effects of alcohol are
not significant factors in this sort of accident, and proximate cause can be readily
ascertained. A plaintiff could claim with some certainty exactly which instance of
alcohol abuse "contributed to the party's action that resulted in her injury."'
Conversely, the effects of various illegal drugs on the mind and body are highly
unpredictable, and often not completely understood. For example, consider a driver
who has a flashback caused by LSD consumed a year ago, loses control, and injures
a bystander. It might be relatively simple to show that his taking that particular
batch of LSD wrs the proximate cause of the flashback and accident. However,
under "gram shop liability," a plaintiff would also be required to defeat the potential
counterarguments that the flashback was instead an unforeseeable reaction between
residual LSD and that morning's breakfast, or perhaps a particular brand of
prescription medicine. If the user had mixed the drug with alcohol, or had taken it
with legal prescription medication, proving proximate cause becomes much more
difficult.4
Similarly, proximate cause would be relatively easy to prove in a case where the
drug user has consumed the drug immediately before the injury and detectable
traces remain in his system. Were this the only illegal drug the user had ever taken,
proximate cause would be manifest. The odds, however, are very much against
encountering this sort of straightforward case involving a singular, recent instance
of drug use. Drug users often use many different drugs over time, and buy their
drugs from different sources." A plaintiff may well end up facing the impossible
40. See id. at 359-60.
41. See, e.g., Semi-annual Trends in Total Drug Episodes (visited Oct. 11, 1998)
<http'//www-samhsa.gov/oas/dawn/dawnmidyr/dawn 13a8.htm#E9E9>. Nationwide, drug abuse is down
somewhat; one doubts, however, that the scarecrow of potential tort liability was a major factor in its
decline.
42. See Bronfin, supra note 12, at 353.
43. See id. at 352, 355.
44. Id. at 352.
45. See DRUG IDENTIFICATION BIBLE 249 (Tim Marnell ed., 1993).
46. For descriptions of the chains of trafficking of different narcotics, see generally INTELLIGENCE
Div., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'r oF JUsTIcE, U.S. DRUG THREAT ASSEssMENT: 1993
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dilemma of trying to prove that the methamphetamine a drug user took on Friday,
rather than the crack cocaine he used on Wednesday, was the proximate cause of
the user's psychotic episode on Sunday.
Further complicating the situation are differences in the chemical formulas of
narcotics introduced through the manufacturing and distribution process. Drug
dealers often buy their drugs from different suppliers, which may show great
variation in quality and purity. Cocaine, for instance, is typically "cut" or treated
with noxious substances (such as gasoline, hydrochloric acid, kerosene, sulfuric
acid, ether, and acetone) at every stage of its production and distribution scheme.47
Heroin is typically adulterated with caffeine (usually mixed in a 1:1 ratio) as well
as quinine or strychnine in much smaller amounts.4" Any variations in these
formulae between suppliers or manufacturers could cause variations in the drug's
subsequent effects, and thus create another basis for disputing that a particular
dealer's narcotics caused a specific accident. Under these circumstances, a rigorous
showing of proximate cause would be nearly impossible.
Another reason that a statute modeled on the doctrine of dram shop liability
would be ineffective is that it could address only immediate consequences of use.
While dram shop laws hold tavern keepers responsible for the torts of their
intoxicated patrons for the extent of their intoxication,49 they do not allow recovery
for long-term effects of alcohol. Therefore, recovery against a bar owner by an
infant born with fetal alcohol syndrome would not be allowed under dram shop
laws. Under the same principle, a child whose development is retarded by its
parents' drug use could not recover from drug dealers. A broader concept of fault
is necessary if victims of more remote injuries, such as birth defects, are to find
relief.
Finally, "gram-shop liability" provides only for recovery from the dealer who sold
illegal drugs to the user; it permits no action against higher-level dealers who are
less likely to be judgment-proof than those at the retail level.' In the heroin
market, for example, drug wholesalers buy smuggled heroin at $15,000-$19,000 per
kilogram; they dilute the heroin and sell to mid-level distributors for $50,000-
$120,000 per kilogram.5" The mid-level distributors, in turn, dilute the heroin again
(1993) [hereinafter U.S. DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT]. Crack cocaine customers have become wary
consumers, as dealers sell unfamiliar customers low-quality or sham cocaine. See id. at 24. LSD dealers
typically have multiple suppliers. See id. at 94. Also, due to the rate of arrest of street-level dealers, drug
users will often need to seek out new sources.
47. See INTELLIGENCE DIV., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COCA
CULTIVATION AND COCAINE PROCESSING 8 (1993).
48. See INTELLIGENCE Div., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEPTr OF JUSTICE, OPIUM POPPY
CULTIVATION AND HEROIN PROCESSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 17 (1993).
49. See Bronfin, supra note 12, at 355.
50. See, e.g., U.S. DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 46, at 28 (regarding crack-house
workers).
51. See INTELLIGENCE DIV., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, SOURCE TO THE
STREET 7 (1993) [hereinafter SOURCE TO THE STREET]. See id. for a flow chart correlated with prices
for Mexican heroin; other illegal drugs are given similar illustrations.
1999]
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and sell it to street-level dealers in ounces for $55,000-$210,000 per kilogram. 2
At retail or street level, the heroin is sold for between $100 and $500 per gram.5 ,
Furthermore, many street-level crack dealers support a drug habit of their own.5'
Street-level dealers have the slimmest profit margin of any stratum of the market;
they run the greatest risks of arrest as well.5 Certainly, fault lies all along the
chain of drug distribution, yet plaintiffs would be denied recovery from the most
solvent (and culpable) parties under "gram-shop liability." Without the threat of
liability across the entire industry, the deterrent effect of this law would act only
upon the street-level dealer - the analog of a bartender in dram shop liability.
C. Drug Dealer Liability Statutes
The third proposed system to permit recovery from drug dealers is the dealer
liability statute. In 1992, former United States Attorney Daniel Bent drafted a law
allowing recovery for injuries caused by illegal drugs.' The American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC) adopted Bent's plan as model legislation. 7 Acting on
the theory that producers and sellers of illegal drugs should be held to at least the
same level of responsibility as are manufacturers of legitimate goods, dealer liability
statutes created a new cause of action loosely based on theories of market share or
alternative liability. Perhaps due in large part to their political appeal as a weapon
in the war on drugs, and perhaps due to awareness generated by the O'Connor case
in California, this approach is the option that has ultimately prevailed in state
legislatures.
In essence, drug dealer liability laws establish a cause of action sounding in tort
for parties injured by illegal drugs. All of them are fairly similar, deriving from the
same legislative source. All are quite broad in scope, imposing liability upon sellers
or those who assist in the chain of commerce of illegal drugs within a target area.
Dealer liability statutes also eliminate causation as a necessary element of such a
claim, and instead impose liability upon proof of participation in the illegal drug
market.
The various drug dealer liability acts have yet to affect the drug trade as
dramatically as their authors and sponsors hoped. Nationally, the only case to test
these laws was decided under Michigan's statute in 1994." The estate of an infant
beaten to death by her crack-addicted mother and the Wayne County, Michigan
Sheriffs Department filed the action jointly against two convicted narcotics
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Ill. Permiis Suits Against Drug Dealers, NATL L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at AS; Arnold Ceballos,
New State Laws Let People Sue Drug Dealers, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1996, at BI.
57. See Ill. Permits Suits Against Drug Dealers, supra note 56, at A8.
58. See statutes cited supra note 9.
59. One source reported that the only case to test these laws was decided in Michigan in 1994. See
Ceballos, supra note 56, at B10; see also Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne
County 1995).
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dealers.'m The default judgment awarded approximately $8 million to the sheriffs
office and $1 million to the baby's estate.6 '
IV. Anatomy of Oklahoma's Drug Dealer Liability Act
Rep. John Bryant introduced a version of Bent's bill in the Oklahoma House of
Representatives in 1994, where it passed on May 9 with minimal debate and
virtually no media attention.' According to Representative Bryant, the bill was
generally well received by interested parties such as district attorneys.' Legislative
counsel anticipated no constitutional problems with the law.' Bryant explained that
the ODDLA's purpose was twofold: to empower victims and to deter dealers.' He
hoped it would "send shivers through those predators" by creating economic
disincentives to drug sales. ' Oklahoma-became the second state to adopt such a
law, shortly after Michigan.
The ODDLA creates two separate forms of action. The first is dealt with in title
63, section 2-424 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Parties allowed to sue under section
2-424 include a drug user's immediate family, anyone exposed to an illegal drug in
utero, a drug user's employer, or any entity which "funds a drug treatment
program . .. for the individual drug user" or "otherwise expended money on behalf
of the individual drug user."'  This last class includes governmental entities,"
which may be represented by a prosecuting attorney." This type of action entitles
a prevailing plaintiff to recover from a person who distributed illegal drugs directly
to the individual drug user.7' The plaintiff may also recover from a person who
distributed the type of drugs the defendant used, at the time the defendant took
them, within an area defined by the statute. n
Under section 2-424, third-party plaintiffs are entitled to recover both economic
damages and non-economic damages for injuries, such as pain and suffering
proximately caused by the illegal drug use.73 They may also recover exemplary
60. See Clemens, No. 95-512918 at 1.
61. See id. As of July 1996, only $25,000 of the judgment had been collected, half of which was
to be placed in a trust fund for the infant's siblings.
62. See Interview with Rep. John Bryant, supra note 10.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Michigan's statute passed in February 1994; Oklahoma's statute passed in May 1994.
68. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-424 (Supp. 1998).
69. See id.
70. See id. § 2-434. Fearing double jeopardy concerns, California's Drug Dealer Liability Act
departed from Oklahoma's example, and declined to allow states or governmental entities to sue under
their Act. See Ceballos, supra note 56, at BI0; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11,700-
11,730 (Vest Supp. 1999).
71. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-425.
72. See id. § 2-424.
73. See id.
1999]
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damages proximately caused by the illegal drug use, reasonable attorney fees, and
the cost of suit."
Plaintiffs under section 2-424 may recover from a defendant if they prove he
"distributed, or participated in the actual chain of distribution of, an illegal drug that
was actually used by the individual user."" Alternatively, a plaintiff may sue a
drug dealer who has sold drugs in a specific area, termed a "target community." '76
The size of the target community varies in proportion to the amount of drugs at
issue. For a relatively minor offense such as possession of one-quarter ounce of
marijuana, termed a "Level One Offense," the target community extends to the
borders of the county in which the offense occurred.& " A "Level Four Offense,"
involving possession of over sixteen pounds of marijuana or sixteen ounces of other
illegal drugs, could expand a dealer's liability to include drug-related injuries
across the entire state." In addition to the element of area, a plaintiff under this
section must also prove the defendant was "connected with" the same type of drug
used by the individual drug user, and that the time of market participation and drug
use were contiguous.'
The second cause of action, set forth in section 2-425, permits the individual drug
user to recover fcr his own injuries."' This cause of action is more narrowly
drawn, with an eye to avoiding unjustly enriching consumers of illegal drugs. An
injured drug consumer is required to cooperate with law enforcement in building a
criminal case against his supplier by disclosing "all information known to the
individual regarding their [sic] source of illegal drugs" at least six months before
initiating the action.' During this six-month period, and during the pendency of
the action, the plaintiff must abstain from illegal drugs." No penalty is provided
for violation of this requirement, but presumably a plaintiffs use of illegal drugs
during this period would constitute grounds for dismissal of the suit.
Individual drug users may recover neither non-economic nor exemplary
damages.& Furthermore, comparative responsibility governs an individual drug
user's award,' although the defendant bears the burden of proving the plaintiffs
comparative responsibility. Should the defendant prove the plaintiff was to some
74. See id.
75. d. § 2-424(B)Y2). This form of action bears a passing resemblance to "grain-shop liability," but
with the important distnction that under the ODDLA the plaintiff need only prove that the individual
drug user actually used the defendant's drugs. There is no requirement under the ODDLA to prove those
same drugs proximately caused his injury.
76. Id.
77. See id § 2-422(5).
78. See id § 2-422(8).
79. See id §§ 2-422 to -427.
80. See id § 2424(B)(2)(b)-(c).
81. See id § 2-425.
82. Id.
83. See id
84. See id
85. See id § 2-423.
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degree responsible for his own injury, the award is diminished "according to the
measure of responsibility attributed to the plaintiff."'
Defendants may not exempt property from either cause of action.' A third
party's payment of damages under indemnification or insurance contracts is likewise
forbidden.' Unlike forfeiture statutes," no requirement mandates proof that a
defendant's property was used in the drug trade in order to seize the property,
forfeiture suits against a drug dealer's property must be disposed of first; judgments
under the Drug Dealer Liability Act are subordinate to forfeiture actions.' Also,
on a motion from a prosecutor or governmental agency, a suit under the ODDLA
may be suspended until criminal investigations and proceedings are complete.9'
The standard of proof for participation in the illegal drug market is "clear and
convincing evidence,"' while other elements must be shown by a preponderance
of the evidence.Y Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this law, however, is
its effective presumption that a criminal conviction creates civil liability." A
defendant convicted of violating state drug laws "is estopped from denying
participation in the illegal drug market."' Furthermore, such a conviction serves
as "prima facie evidence of the participation of the person in the illegal drug market
during the two years preceding the date of an act giving rise to a conviction."6
Thus, a drug conviction within the "target community," and within two years after
a drug-related injury in that target community, practically creates an undeniable
presumption of liability for a drug-related injury under section 2-431.
V. Defenses to Drug Dealer Liability Suits
Unlike criminal sentences of restitution, which are judicially imposed, suits under
the ODDLA offer a defendant an opportunity to defend himself. The causes of
action outlined in the ODDLA ultimately resemble simple suits in tort. Liability
must be established by "clear and convincing evidence."" Elements must be
proven. Despite the extensive reach of dealer liability, a defendant is left with
sundry means to avoid its grasp.
For example, "knowing" participation in the illegal drug market is a mental
element required in actions under section 2-424. Thus, while under section 2-431
86. Id.
87. See id. § 2-432.
88. See i. § 2-426.
89. See id. § 2-503.
90. See id. § 2-432.
91. See i. § 2-434.
92. ld. § 2-431.
93. See id
94. Note that a criminal drug conviction is not a required element of a cause of action under the
ODDLA. A conviction merely stops the defendant from denying participation in the illegal drug market
within the target community.
95. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-431.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 2-431.
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a prior criminal conviction under state drug laws stops a defendant from denying
"participation in the illegal drug market," it does not prevent the defendant from
denying that his participation was knowing."' Because some of Oklahoma's
criminal statutes crlminalize the mere possession of illegal drugs," regardless of
the possessor's mental state, this element becomes crucial to a defense. Consider a
hapless defendant who agrees to carry a present to someone in another city, only
to find out upon hi:; arrest that the package contains illegal drugs. Although this
defendant would likely face criminal charges for drug possession, his ignorance
would serve as a defense to suits under the ODDLA. The distinction is a fair one;
dealer liability law,; are intended to deter drug trafficking, not to punish it. An
unknowing defendant has not demonstrated the same callous disregard for public
safety as has a knowing and willful drug dealer.
Similarly, "participation in the illegal drug market," according to the Act's
definitions, "does not include the purchase or receipt of an illegal drug for personal
use only.'"" A defendant who can establish that drugs in his possession were
solely for his own use has not participated in the illegal drug market, and thus is not
liable under the ODDLA, although whether a prior criminal drug conviction would
estop such a claim (under section 2-431) is not clear from the language of the
statute. The logic behind this distinction is similar to that underlying the knowledge
requirement; a defendant who intends to use drugs and suffer their consequences
himself is not so blameworthy as a dealer who maliciously releases them upon the
public.
VI. Criticism of Dealer Liability Statutes
Academia has bemn less receptive to dealer liability statutes than have state
legislatures. The few scholars who have addressed dealer liability statutes have been
skeptical, claiming the laws are unconstitutionally broad, and yet incapable of
establishing real justice. Three arguments against dealer liability are discussed.
First, the establishment of a statutory presumption of liability for convicted dealers
and of political boundaries for liability are arbitrary and irrational presumptions, and
therefore violate due process rights. Second, a state's civil suit against a previously
convicted dealer violates double jeopardy protections. Third, the elimination of
causation as an element of liability abrogates fundamental principles of tort law.
A. Dealer Liability Implicates Due Process Rights
The first objecticn is that dealer liability laws create statutory presumptions of
fact which violate due process rights.'0' A rational connection between a fact to
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., ic § 2-402.
100. Id § 2-422(9)
101. See Wendy Stsell, 'Shopping'for Defendants: Market Liability Under the Illinois Drug Dealer
Liability Act, 27 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 1023, 1047-51 (1996). Stasell writes regarding the Illinois Drug
Dealer Liability Statute, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 57/25(b) (West Supp. 1996), which is substantially
similar to Oklahoma's statute, except that Illinois' law contains no provision permitting district attorneys
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be proved and the fact presumed is required for such a statute to be upheld as
constitutional."~ Lacking a requirement that a plaintiff prove that it was the
defendant's drugs which caused his injury, rather than drugs sold by anyone else in
the area, a statute's presumption that participation in the drug trade equals causation
is not a rational connection." Another due process argument against dealer
liability statutes is that the definition of "target communities" creates arbitrary
political units that ignore the fungible nature of drugs. Because an injury in one part
of the state may have been caused by drugs purchased elsewhere, liability is based
on "an illogical presumption" which "fails to satisfy the requirements of due
process."' 4
However, one might visualize the illegal drug industry as its own miniature
economy. When supply is up, prices fall. When prices are low, people use more
drugs, especially addictive ones. A scarcity of drugs in one city may cause an
increase in the price somewhere else as drug supplies are redistributed to meet
demand. Each of the thousands of individual transactions that constitute the drug
market affects every other transaction, however slightly; it would be unrealistic to
ignore this effect in crafting a public policy designed to remedy drug-related injuries
and reduce the use and sale of illegal drugs.
Critics object to the arbitrary nature of drug dealer liability because there is a
significant chance that a particular dealer's drugs were not the cause of a plaintiffs
injury."w However, considering the interrelatedness of the drug market, any
contribution to the supply of, or demand for, illegal drugs will bolster the industry.
And as the industry grows, so does the risk of violence, addiction, and disease.
Each seller of illegal drugs, through his participation in the illegal drug market,
contributes to this risk. This risk is foreseeable, avoidable, rational, and should be
actionable. As such, each dealer should bear a portion of the responsibility for a
victim's injuries.
In light of this economic approach to drug liability, the political units set out in
the ODDLA look less arbitrary. One constant in the dynamics of the drug trade is
geography; cocaine is traditionally cheap in Miami where the supply is bountiful,
and expensive in New York where the demand exceeds the supply." While these
variations might not be so dramatic between counties of rural Oklahoma, the drug
markets in each community are tied directly to the risk and expense of drug-related
injury.
In analyzing the Act's constitutionality generally, dealer liability laws may be
compared to a similar statutory eradication of the cause requirement: the nationwide
establishment of state workers' compensation statutes. One commentator provides
a succinct history of the legislative reception of workers' compensation laws:
to sue on behalf of victims or counties.
102. See i.d at 1048.
103. See id
104. hI. at 1047.
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., SouRc To THE STREEr, supra note 51, at 7.
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Workers' compensation in the United States grew largely out of the
consequences of the Industrial Revolution....
Workers were often unable to obtain compensation because of the
cost and complexity of bringing a tort action and because of the
powerful defenses available to employers .... If an employee did bring
a tort action, three main defenses allowed employers to escape
liability ...... "First, under the fellow servant rule, an employee could
not recover damages from the employer if another employee had
contributed to the injury . ... Second, under the principle of
contributory negligence, the injured employee could not recover
damages if he had in any way negligently contributed to his own
injury." Finally, under the "assumption of risk" doctrine, an employee
could not collect damages in many instances because she was held to
have assumed the risk of injury from the customary and observable
dangers attendant upon the job....
... By 1911, ten states had adopted workers' compensation laws, and
by 1917, the number of states had increased to thirty-seven .... [I]n
1949 all fifty ;tates had workers' compensation systems."°
The history of workers' compensation law shows how a statutory remedy
designed to repair injustice inherent in the common law soon became the law of the
land." s By dispensing with a causation requirement, workers' compensation laws
essentially imposed strict liability for workplace injuries upon the manufacturer.
Initial concerns about the law's radical changes to the tort claims process have been
answered, and workers' compensation is npw a standard principle of American
jurisprudence.
B. Double Jeopardy
A second charge against drug dealer liability laws is that double jeopardy attaches
when the state sues a criminal it has already convicted." One critic cites evidence
from legislative history that the Illinois Legislature intended the Illinois Drug Dealer
Liability Act to serve a deterrent purpose, rather than just a remedial purpose for
injured parties."' The statute could even be construed as punitive in effect, since
it allows a third-party plaintiff to recover more than actual damages."' Thus, for
the state to permit enormous judgments against criminals whom it has already
107. Renee L. Cwnacho, A Comparison of Workers' Compensation in the United States and Mexico,
26 N.M. L. REv. 133, 136-37 (1996) (quoting ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIPFAULT, WORKERS
COMPENSATION: STRENG"IIENING THE SOCIAL COMPACr 14 (1991)).
108. For a general, contemporary history of the adoption of workers' compensation laws across the
country, see J.E. RHODES, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1917).
109. See Stasell, syipra note 101, at 1051.
110. See id
111. See id at 1052-53.
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punished is in effect a second punishment for the same offense."' For example,
the amount of money that the Wayne County Sheriffs department was awarded in
the Michigan example above is disproportionate to the amount of money that the
state spent as a result of the defendant's drug sales."' It is also argued that the
unique provision of Oklahoma's dealer liability law permitting a prosecutor to
represent the state or a county government" allows for essentially a second
prosecution by the state."'
The issue of double jeopardy is a valid one. One response to such criticism is
that the particular purposes of this law can best be served by state involvement.
Due to the widespread (and accurate) perception of drug trafficking as an extremely
treacherous, violent business, victims may be reluctant to assert their right to
recovery against a convicted drug dealer. Many lawyers, as well, might avoid taking
on potentially dangerous cases. A district attorney's office, on the other hand, is
ideal for handling this sort of lawsuit because its prosecutorial duties place its
attorneys in adversarial contact with dangerous criminals every day. A district
attorney will be prepared to take steps to minimize the dangers presented by a
potentially violent defendant and give other parties the confidence to pursue such
a suit."'
Double Jeopardy law has changed radically since United States v. Halper"7 in
1989. Halper held that a civil sanction that "cannot fairly be said to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive
or deterrent purpose, is punishment as we have come to understand the term.""'
Since the ODDLA allows for one class of plaintiffs to collect punitive damages,"'
and since it prohibits indemnification or insurance for a judgment under the Act,'"
the ODDLA would have likely failed to pass constitutional muster under Halper.
After Halper, however, the U.S. Supreme Court retreated from the strict
delineation of remedial, deterrent, and punitive state actions. This retreat culminated
in Hudson v. United States.2' Hudson was involved in a banking scandal in
Tipton, Oklahoma. Hudson was assessed a "civil money penalty" under a federal
statute in 1989, and then indicted criminally in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma.'" Hudson claimed the criminal prosecution
amounted to double jeopardy.
112. See id.
113. See Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County 1995).
114. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-434 (Supp. 1998).
115. See Stasell, supra note 101, at 1051-55.
116. The violent nature of the drug trafficking business illustrates a related aspect of drug dealer
liability suits: the likelihood of frivolous suits under a drug dealer liability statute is very slim, given the
drug trade's reputation for retaliation. There are many easier and safer ways of making money than suing
drug dealers.
117. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
118. Id. at 448.
119. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-424 (Supp. 1998).
120. See i. § 2-426.
121. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
122. See id. at 95-97.
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The Hudson Court amended Halper in two significant ways. First, the Court
indicated the threshold inquiry in double jeopardy questions was whether "the
punishment at issue is a criminal punishment."'" Second, it required scrutiny of
the statute, rather than of the particular punishment, to determine whether a law
provides for a criminal sanction." Under Hudson, courts must first look for a
clear indication within statutory language that a legislature intends a particular
penalty to be civil in character.'" Hudson then sets out seven "guideposts" to
assess whether a statute is criminal in nature, regardless of apparent legislative
intent to establish a civil penalty." First, Hudson requires courts to consider
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint. Second, a court
must decide if the sanction has historically been regarded as punitive. Third, a court
must consider whether the sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter.
Fourth, a court must consider whether the sanction will promote the traditional aims
of punishment: retribution and deterrence. Fifth, a court must determine if the
behavior to which the sanction applies is already a crime. Sixth, a court must decide
if an alternative puqose exists with which the sanction may rationally be associated.
Finally, a court mu;t ask whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned." The Court noted immediately that "'only the
clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil penalty into a criminal penalty."''
The Court applied this test to the federal banking statutes under which Hudson
had been penalized."2 9 First, the Court looked to the language of the statutes to
determine whether Congress had indicated the penalties to be civil in nature. The
statute's express estz.blishment of "civil" penalties was found sufficient to satisfy the
first part of the test,' The Court then examined the statute for criminal purpose
or effect in light of the seven guidelines. Working its way through the guidelines
one by one, the Court found that "the clearest proof' did not exist that the statutes
were actually criminal, and therefore did not rise to the level of a separate criminal
punishment of Hudson.'
An analysis of a statute under Hudson is an all-or-nothing affair. There is no
question of penalties within specific cases rising to the level of punishment; a
sanction is either punishment or it is not. Should a court apply Hudson to the
ODDLA, then, it will need do so only once.
The ODDLA is explicit about the intended civil nature of its sanction: "[a] person
who knowingly participates in the illegal drug market within this state is liable for
123. Id. at 101.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 99.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 99-100.
128. Ld. at 100.
129. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1997) (applying 12 U.S.C. §§ 84(a)(1),
93(b)(1), 504(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 656, 1005).
130. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (applying 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(b)(I), 504(a) (1982)).
131. See id. at 99-102.
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civil damages as provided in the Drug Dealer Liability Act."'" Therefore, the
ODDLA clearly meets the first prong of the Hudson test. The second test,
examining whether the statute is defacto criminal, leaves more room for debate.
Hudson first recognizes that money penalties are not necessarily criminal in
nature. Even the penalties assessed against Hudson, which were not based on any
damages suffered by the government,' were characterized as civil." The
ODDLA's penalties are purely monetary and impose no "affirmative disability or
restraint."'3 While the ODDLA's penalties may have, in part, a deterrent purpose,
the existence of a deterrent effect may serve alternative goals as well. The penalties
in Hudson, for example, served to "promote the stability of the banking in-
dustry."'' " The ODDLA's purpose of providing recovery to victims of illegal drugs
and drug-related crimes would likely be construed to be a similarly valid alternative
purpose.
On the other hand, scienter is an element of actions under the ODDLA, since
"knowing" participation in the drug market must be proved. 31 Another possible
argument that the ODDLA is criminal in nature is that the act the ODDLA seeks
to deter, trafficking in illegal drugs, is already a separate crime. The banking statute
discussed in Hudson, however, also duplicated criminal conduct. The Hudson Court
found this fact "insufficient to render the ... sanctions criminally punitive" and
noted that there is no "same-conduct" test for double-jeopardy purposes."
On balance, the ODDLA appears to meet the Hudson Court's definition of a
"1civil" sanction. Even the evidence that tends to show the ODDLA was mistakenly
labeled a civil remedy (i.e., the existence of a scienter requirement and its overlap
with criminal statutes) does not rise to the high standard of "clearest proof" which
Hudson requires. For these reasons, courts will likely find that district attorneys
may represent the State and other plaintiffs in actions under the ODDLA, without
violating defendants' constitutional double jeopardy protections.
C. Fundamental Principles of Tort Law
Illinois' dealer liability law has been called unfair because it "abrogates
fundamental tort principles" of causation.'39 Because the element of causation
protects several important interests, such as separating innocent from culpable actors
and preventing injustice, damages should not be awarded without proving the
relationship between a defendant's conduct and a plaintiffs injury."0 Quoting
Justice Cardozo in PaIsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,"'' one commentator opines
132. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-423 (Supp. 1998).
133. See Hudson, 522 U.S at 96-97.
134. See id. at 103.
135. Id. at 99.
136. Id. at 105.
137. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-423.
138. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105.
139. Stasell, supra note 101, at 1055.
140. See id. at 1057-58.
141. 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
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that Illinois' Drug Dealer Liability Act grants relief for "negligence in the air" rather
than for proximate cause."
Another criticism of dealer liability laws is that the broad theory of "market share
liability" used in apportioning liability under Illinois' Drug Dealer Liability Act
violates fundamental principles of fairness.'43 While some state courts do not
accept market share liability, the theory remains unsettled as a matter of Oklahoma
law. Rather than embrace such a broad innovation through judicial decree, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has invited legislative efforts to impose market share
liability through statute.'" Furthermore, the scheme for apportionment of liability
common to the vafious drug dealer liability acts, including the ODDLA, is actually
closer in function and character to alternative liability, a more venerable and more
widely accepted theory of tort law. Oklahoma courts hold alternative liability in
higher esteem.4 '
1. Market Share Liability
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories'" was the source of the theory of market share
liability. In Sindell, nearly 200 pharmaceutical companies had each marketed the
synthetic estrogen DES, which was given to the plaintiffs mother during pregnancy.
The plaintiff claimed that in utero exposure to DES caused her cancer later in life,
but she could not identify the manufacturer of the medicine her mother had
taken.47 The Sindell court stated:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in
science and technology create fungible goods which may harm
consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The
response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine,
denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to fashion
remedies to meet these changing needs.'"
Fashioning such a remedy, the Sindell court held that if it were shown to be
significantly likely that one of the five named defendants had in fact been the
manufacturer of the drug in question, there is little injustice in shifting the burden
of proof to the defendants to show they could not have made the medicine which
the plaintiffs mother took.'49 The Sindell court applied this proportionality
approach to the allocation of damages as well, holding that each defendant was
liable for a proportion of the judgment commensurate with its proportion in the
market of DES.'
142. Stasell, supra note 101, at 1057.
143. See id. at 1055.
144. See Case v. Fibreboard, 743 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Okla.- 1987).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 173-75.
146. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
147. See id. at 931.
148. Id. at 936.
149. See iU
150. See id.
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Market share theory, however, was not adopted in Illinois; the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected market share liability as an unsound proposition in Smith v. Eli
Lilly.' A concern of the Smith court was that "some defendants wholly innocent
of wrongdoing toward a particular plaintiff would inevitably shoulder part or all of
the responsibility for the injury." "
The future of Sindell's market share liability does not look much brighter in
Oklahoma's courts. In Wood v. Eli Lilly,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit Court declined to apply the market share liability theory in the
context of DES litigation under Oklahoma law.'" The Oklahoma Supreme Court
addressed the question more thoroughly in Case v. Fibreboard."
Case involved a sheet-metal worker who was exposed in various locations across
Oklahoma to asbestos that had been produced by various manufacturers." As a
result of his exposure, he was injured and sued several different manufacturers of
asbestos on a market share theory.'" Discovery revealed that Case was not certain
of exactly which products, produced by which manufacturers, he had been ex-
posed.' Consequently, Case could not connect any of the manufacturers to the
particular asbestos products to which he had been exposed.' 9
The Case court noted that Sindell dealt not with asbestos but with DES, which
was "truly fungible" because it is manufactured from a single formula.' On the
other hand, the "asbestos" that the plaintiff had been exposed to was not so simple,
because it is commonly manufactured from six different minerals into six different
products that pose varying degrees of danger.'
The Case court acknowledged that there were definite public policy reasons for
allowing a victim like Case to recover against the asbestos companies." However,
without more accurate proof of causation, the court would not consider imposing
a market share liability scheme. The court noted that "the creation of a program of
compensation for victims of asbestos related injuries as a matter of policy is a
matter for the legislative body and not for the courts."'"
Given the varying manufacturing processes, sources, and additives of most illegal
drugs," the Supreme Court of Oklahoma would not likely find them to be
fungible in the same sense as DES, i.e., manufactured to the same exacting
standards. Thus, absent a clear statute such as the Drug Dealer Liability Act,
151. 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990).
152. Stasell, supra note 101, at 1033.
153. 38 F.3d 510 (10th Cir. 1992).
154. See id. at 513-14.
155. 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987).
156. See id. at 1063.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1065.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1066-67.
163. Id. at 1067.
164. See supra notes 47-48 (regarding the composition and manufacture of heroin and cocaine).
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Oklahoma would probably not extend market share liability to illegal drugs on a
traditional theory of fungibility.
A true system of market share liability would be impossible to impose on a
clandestine industry. No accurate method exists to determine the appropriate market
percentages; authorities can only estimate how much of a certain drug is produced
or sold within the state, much less what percentage was sold through a particular
source. Attempting to apportion damages based on a drug dealer's actual share of
the market is unrealistic. In fact, market share liability resembles the apportionment
of the burden of causation within the ODDLA much less than does its parent theory
of alternative liability.
The second and more important lesson of Case, however, is that while the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma refused to adopt market share liability as a necessary
function of common law, it deferred to the Oklahoma Legislature to provide a
statutory scheme to advance the public policy interest of seeing that asbestos victims
are entitled to recover. 6' Although courts generally have declined to expand the
common law to allow victims of drug dealers to recover, just as they have been
slow to adopt market share liability," a legislative scheme to do so would likely
be met with deference from the court.
2. Alternative Liability
The theory of alternative liability was first introduced in the California case of
Summers v. Tice."6 Summers involved three quail hunters. The two defendants
both negligently fired at a rising bird with shotguns, and a pellet from one weapon
struck the plaintiff in the eye. The court was unable to determine from which gun
the pellet had been fired, but the negligence of only one hunter could have caused
the injury.
The Summers court held that the burden of proof should be shifted to the
defendants to exonerate themselves.'" "Ordinarily defendants are in a better
position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury,"' ' but, the
court reasoned, "[i]f the defendants are independent tort feasors and thus each liable
for the damage caused by him alone, and, at least, where the matter of apportion-
ment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of
his right to redress."'"7 Concurrent with the ODDLA's right of contribution for
defendants,"' "[tihe wrongdoers should be left to work out between themselves
any apportionment."'"
165. See Case. 743 P.2d at 1067.
166. See id. at 1064 nn.6-8.
167. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
168. See id. at 5.
169. Id. at 4.
170. d. at 5.
171. See 63 OKL\. STAT. § 2-430 (Supp. 1998).
172. Summers, 199 P.2d at 5.
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Alternative liability was taken up by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Hood
v. Hagler,'" which involved a woman bitten by one of two nearly identical
German Shepherds owned by different persons. Because the dog bit the woman
from behind, she could not identify which dog bit her. The court adopted the
Summers approach, because both owners had been negligent in maintaining their
animals." "[We do not believe that the plaintiff should, under the circumstances
before us, be placed in the position of having to point to which of the two dogs
actually bit her," the court opined, and laid the burden on the defendants to
exonerate themselves.'"s
While Hood is still good law for dog bites, Wood declined to extend alternative
liability to DES litigation.76 Case also refused to extend alternative liability to
litigation involving asbestos." Nonetheless, Case's deference to statutory schemes
of compensation suggests that the use of established principles of alternative liability
within the ODDLA will be well received.'
This discussion of market share liability versus alternative liability is relevant to
the ODDLA only insofar as it illustrates whether a similar system of liability,
imposed across an industry, violates fundamental principles of tort law. In Illinois,
it likely does. In Oklahoma, the principles of market share liability have not yet
been sufficiently established to be considered "fundamental," although alternative
liability has been expressly adopted. Because it permits joint and several liability
instead of assigning blame based on market participation, the ODDLA is more
closely related to alternative liability than to market share liability. The legislature
did not create the ODDLA out of whole cloth, but instead simply adapted a
principle of Oklahoma law instituted in Hood to the illegal drug market. As such,
the ODDLA's exclusion of the element of causation did not depart from established
principles of Oklahoma tort law.
VII. Conclusion
A final criticism of drug dealer liability legislation asserts that such laws are more
of a popular political gimmick than serious, effective law." Detractors claim that
these laws will have little practical success in deterring the drug trade or in
compensating drug dealers' victims."u Analyzing the economics of the drug trade,
one article suggests that since drug dealers already risk jail time, civil forfeiture, and
violence from competitors, the added deterrent value of a civil suit is minimal.''
173. 606 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1979).
174. See id. at 553.
175. Id.
176. Wood v. Eli Lilly, 38 F.3d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1992).
177. Case v. Fibreboard, 743 P.2d 1067, 1067 (Okla. 1987).
178. Id.
179. See Mark Hansen, Just Say "See You in Court". Drug Users Can Seek Dealers' Cash Under
New Liability Laws, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 30.
180. See Note, Tort Law - Civil Liability for Criminal Acts - Illinois Expands Civil Liability for
Drug Traffickers, 109 HARV. L. REV. 699, 703-04 (1996).
181. See id. at 701-02.
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Furthermore, drug dealers typically "live in economically depressed neighborhoods,
keep all of their assets portable, and deal exclusively in cash."'"
The same article suggests that "the lure of easy lucre" may encourage prosecutors
to neglect routine criminal investigations to pursue dealer liability actions."3 Citing
examples of existing windfalls of forfeited drug money, and the poor management
they have received at the hands of law enforcement agencies, critics suggest that
overzealous district attorneys will use dealer liability as a means of circumventing
the limits of already broad drug forfeiture laws.""
The question of the ODDLA's practical effect as a source of remedies and as a
deterrent to drug traffic will never be answered unless use of such statutes becomes
widespread. Granted, it must withstand constitutional challenges before the question
can be answered, but critics of this law claim that it would never work as a practical
deterrent - usually within a few pages of advocating some weaker version of
dealer liability.'"
Obviously, the ODDLA is not a silver bullet that will dispense with America's
drug problem once and for all. Assuming, however, that a few well-publicized test
cases are successfiilly litigated, these laws have the potential to change radically the
way the illegal drug market operates. For example, the discovery process of civil
trials would be effective in penetrating the smokescreen surrounding laundered drug
money. Ordinary forfeiture statutes cannot touch a vast amount of legitimately
accumulated assets, as well as laundered funds, but no property is exempt from a
judgment under dealer liability, which could potentially reach to the highest
echelons of drug organizations."
Furthermore, because a defendant need not have a criminal drug conviction to be
sued under the CDDLA, recovery of drug money could occur even when enough
evidence did not exist for a criminal charge. This lower threshold of proof may
encourage personal injury attorneys, not just district attorneys, to initiate dealer
liability actions. Conceivably, relentless litigation from the public and private
sectors may cause the price of illegal drugs to escalate as traffickers' profits go
toward legal fees in addition to their already high overhead.
Were narcotics legalized and produced under the protection rather than the
condemnation of our legal system, traditional legal remedies would undoubtedly be
extended to their consumers. For example, were cocaine or methamphetamines
legally marketed by a major pharmaceutical company for recreational use, strict
182. l. at 703.
183. See i.
184. See id. at 702-03.
185. See e.g., Btonfin, supra note 12, at 365.
186. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2-432 (Supp. 1998). Realistically, the myriad difficulties in enforcing
judgments intematio:aally would tend to thwart most plaintiffs in suits against the highest levels of
international drug trafficking organizations. Nonetheless, any assets held in the United States might be
vulnerable to attachment under a judgment in an American court. Perhaps a state attorney general's
office, especially on. ekperienced with tobacco litigation, could successfully administer a complex
international lawsuit against a drug cartel. The political capital to be generated by such a case is
considerable.
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products liability might be an applicable theory for recovery. If the risks of
addictive, mind-altering drugs are found to outweigh their social benefit, their
manufacturer may be held strictly liable for the injuries they inflict.'" Were
narcotics legalized and then produced under the same varying, unsafe conditions as
they are while manufactured illegally, and sold without clear directions for use and
warnings regarding their side effects, liability would be manifest under a theory of
negligence, in addition to products liability.
The fact that narcotics are illegal should not prohibit legal remedies for both
consumers and third parties. Unlike judicial sanctions and gram-shop liability, drug
dealer liability laws safeguard the rights of the victim as well as those of the
defendant. These laws address the short and long-term consequences of drug use
and reach leaders within a drug organization's chain of command.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the ODDLA does not deprive defendants of
constitutional due process rights, nor protections against double jeopardy. Nor does
it violate principles of fundamental fairness. Instead, dealer liability represents a
relevant and workable opportunity to address issues of drug-related injury, violence,
and suffering. The victims of this "victimless crime" deserve a fair and effective
remedy, and both plaintiffs and defendants deserve access to the protections
afforded by the civil litigation process.
Clinton W. Taylor
187. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (NJ. 1983).
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